Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
T he asymmetric treatment of tax losses is an attribute common to all corporate income tax systems. If a corporation's income exceeds allowable deductions, then its net income is taxed at the statutory rate. However, if the reverse holds true, a corporation does not receive a refund equal to the tax value of its loss. Instead, corporations must carry losses backward or forward in time to offset prior or future payments of tax. In most cases, fi rms are forced to carry some portion of their tax loss forward. Carryforward fi rms receive only a partial refund of their tax loss because the real value of the loss erodes over time. For certain fi rms, losses that are carried forward have no inherent value as the fi rm is unable to generate suffi cient taxable income to ever utilize the loss.
The partial refundability of tax losses has important implications for researchers interested in corporate investment and fi nancing decisions. Firms that carry losses forward may face very different marginal tax rates on investment compared to fi rms that do not carry losses forward. If the investment is debt fi nanced, then any marginal tax rate discrepancy could increase. Researchers who ignore the implications of the corporate loss regime risk omitting a key factor that may explain why otherwise similar fi rms have different investment patterns. It may also explain why certain industries appear to be less responsive to tax incentives such as accelerated deprecation.
Partial Loss Refundability: How Are Corporate Tax Losses Used?*
Whether the corporate loss regime has a perceptible impact on marginal tax rates depends upon the prevalence of loss carryforward fi rms and the relative size of firms' loss carryforward stock. 1 In general, longer delays between the generation and utilization of a tax loss can manifest itself through larger marginal tax rate differentials between loss carryforward and taxable fi rms. Using corporate tax return data for tax years 1993-2003, we construct a unique dataset to measure how quickly corporations use tax losses. For most tax years, we fi nd that approximately 10-15 percent of losses generated in a given year are carried back for an immediate tax refund. Carryback fi rms suffer no inherent penalty from the partial refund regime. Over a ten-year window, we find that approximately 40-50 percent of losses are used as a loss carryforward deduction, approximately 25-30 percent are lost (i.e., the fi rm no longer exists) and 10-20 percent remain unused. For losses that are used as a loss carryforward deduction, we find that there can be substantial delays between the generation and utilization of the tax loss. Based on these results, it appears that many fi rms incur a signifi cant penalty from partial refundability due to a reduction in the real value of their tax loss or the inability to ever use the tax loss. This paper proceeds as follows. The second section discusses how the US tax system treats corporate tax losses and provides a brief comparison of full and partial loss refund regimes. The third section discusses the methodology and dataset used for this analysis. The fourth section provides a comparison of our dataset to the C corporation population to provide context for our results. The fi fth section illustrates how fi rms included in our dataset used tax losses that were generated in tax years [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] . It also provides detail on the time pattern of loss carryforward deductions that originate from a specifi c loss year.
FULL VERSUS PARTIAL LOSS REFUNDABILITY
In theory, corporate income tax systems could allow any degree of loss utilization ranging from zero to full loss refundability. Currently, all Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)countries with a corporate income tax reside somewhere in the middle of this continuum; no country completely disallows losses or grants full and immediate refunds. A key factor that determines a tax system's position on this continuum is the time parameters in which a fi rm may use a tax loss. 2 More generous carryback and carryforward rules will move a system closer to full loss refundability. All OECD countries allow fi rms to carry tax losses forward in time: approximately two-thirds allow firms to carry losses forward from fi ve to ten years; the remainder allow indefi nite loss carryforward. By contrast, only eight OECD countries allow fi rms to carry losses back to offset prior payments. 3 For countries that allow carryback, tax losses may be carried back between one and three tax years. 4 Despite the fact that no tax system allows full loss refundability, the partial 1 In addition, if we are concerned about the impact of the loss regime on corporate investment and fi nancing decisions, we would also consider each fi rm's or industry's share of total corporate investment and debt. 2 Other important factors include consolidation and transferability rules. These rules are complex and are beyond the scope of this paper. For a good discussion of these issues and how they relate to a tax system's location on the loss refund continuum, see Donnelly and Young (2002) . 3 Carryback countries include Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands and United Kingdom and the United States. 4 For the US, fi rms must carry losses back unless they actively elect out of the carryback system. The election is irrevocable. Firms must carry losses back to the oldest tax year fi rst.
refund system has many well-known shortcomings. A conspicuous flaw is that fi rms that carry losses forward can face very different marginal tax rates on investment than taxable fi rms. Some carryforward firms may face higher marginal tax rates because the reduction in tax liability attributable to accelerated tax depreciation allowances may be effectively delayed. If the stock of loss carryforwards is large enough for the fi rm to achieve non-taxable status, then the benefi cial effect of additional depreciation allowances is not realized until some future year, thereby increasing the fi rm's cost of capital. Alternatively, it is possible that carryforward fi rms face lower marginal tax rates. For example, a persistent loss carryforward fi rm essentially faces a marginal tax rate of zero. Which outcome is realized depends upon the number of years a fi rm is expected to be non-taxable (i.e., the size of a fi rm's loss stock) and the degree of accelerated depreciation allowed under tax law.
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It is also well known that a partial refund system discriminates against certain types of fi rms, industries and investments. As shown by Mintz (1988) , new fi rms with "start-up" or standalone investments may face especially high marginal tax rates because the taxing authority shares in the profi ts of the fi rm, but does not share in the downside risk of the investment. Unlike a diversifi ed and mature fi rm, the new fi rm cannot offset the loss against profi ts from other lines of business. If the investment does not generate a profi t, it is possible that the new fi rm will expire and will never utilize the tax loss over its short life. Less extreme is the penalty incurred by cyclical industries that must carry losses forward in time. For those industries, the penalty arises from the erosion in the real value of their tax loss. Finally, partial refundability discriminates against risky investments due to the uncertainty associated with the investment's potential stream of returns. A fi rm choosing between two projects with equal expected returns (neglecting loss asymmetries) will opt for the less risky project due to the potential reduction in the real value of any tax loss that may be incurred and carried forward (Mintz, 1988) .
In addition to these shortcomings, advocates of full loss refundability note three advantages of that system. First, partial refund systems are inherently complex due to the rules necessary to ensure that corporations claim losses only once and do not pass losses to unqualifi ed entities. By contrast, a full loss refund system could, in theory, be implemented by the addition of a few lines on the tax return. Second, the immediate refund of tax losses would inject needed cash fl ows to loss fi rms. The additional income could smooth any temporary disruptions in the fi rm's production or hiring plans and reduce frictions associated with hiring, fi ring and job search. In this manner, full loss refundability would act as a countercyclical stabilizing mechanism. Finally, full loss refundability would not reduce the appeal of tax incentives to loss and loss carryforward fi rms. Because loss and loss carryforward fi rms are unable to realize any immediate benefi t from tax credits or accelerated depreciation, their utilization of these provisions tends to be much lower compared to profi table fi rms.
The primary arguments employed against full refundability relate to revenue concerns and the increased potential for fraud and abuse. Partial refund advocates must appeal to these factors because there is no theoretical justifi cation for the disallowance of full refundability. Periodic tax losses are an expected outcome of business operations. The tax system should not penalize certain fi rms, industries or investments based on the volatility of their net income.
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The revenue implications of a full loss refund system are real and not easily dismissed. Under certain conditions, it has been noted that the steady state cost of a full loss refund system could be relatively small (Poddar, 1991) . For example, if we disregard pre-existing loss stocks and assume that fi rms eventually use all tax losses, then the long-run cost of a full refund system would be zero; all revenue issues would relate to timing.
8 However, as shown later, this assumption clearly does not hold for the US. Because many tax losses are never used, full loss refundability would have a non-trivial impact on revenues. Moreover, a full loss refund system would dramatically increase the volatility of corporate income tax revenues. From the perspective of the taxing authority, this outcome may be especially undesirable as net revenues would decline during cyclical downturns when they are needed most.
Fraud and abuse concerns, although less quantifi able, are also real. If tax losses received equal treatment, it is conceivable that some fi rms would engage in dubious activities or transactions to increase tax losses. There are numerous transactions that fi rms have used to generate paper losses in order to offset taxable income. It would be straightforward to modify these transactions to increase tax losses. It is not possible to gauge the signifi cance of this issue because no tax system currently allows full refundability. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that the symmetric treatment of tax losses could only increase the scope for abuse relative to a partial refund system.
Finally, we note that some partial refund advocates believe that full refundability would encourage uneconomic (i.e., unprofitable) investment. For example, full loss refundability may simply delay the death of an unprofi table firm and waste private and public resources. This rationale has little appeal. It is unlikely that the tax refund, by itself, would cause an otherwise unprofi table fi rm to remain in operation for any length of time. The fi rm still realizes a tax loss even if 35 percent of the loss is returned in the form of a tax refund. More importantly, this justifi cation violates the effi ciency principle that the tax system should not interfere with the market mechanism. The tax system should maintain neutrality and avoid speculating on the ultimate viability of a fi rm that incurs a tax loss.
In summary, the implicit penalty imposed on fi rms by partial loss refundability is a function of the time needed to use the tax loss. If fi rms can immediately carry losses back in time, then firms will incur no penalty; carryback refunds are tantamount to full loss refundability. Conversely, delays in the utilization of tax losses likely increase marginal tax rate discrepancies and disproportionately penalize certain fi rms, industries and investments. In the sections that follow, we attempt to gauge this penalty by examining how quickly fi rms use tax losses.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
For this analysis, we defi ne a net operating loss (NOL) as the excess of allowable tax deductions over total income. The NOLs we examine are attributable to the operation of a trade or business; they do not include capital loss income. 9 We defi ne a carryback refund as a tax loss that is used to offset tax liability attributable to a prior tax year. Taxpayers typically fi le an application for a carryback refund within six months of the end of their tax year. Finally, we defi ne a net operating loss deduction (NOLD) as the loss carryforward the taxpayer reports on their tax return as a deduction against current year income. Net operating loss deductions are claimed after the computation of Net Income. Taxpayers claim NOLDs until any positive Net Income is eliminated.
Data Sources
We use two data sources for this analysis. The primary data source is IRS' Statistics of Income (SOI) corporate samples for tax years 1993-2003. The SOI sample for each tax year is composed of approximately 80,000 to 140,000 fi rms that are sampled based on asset size and gross proceeds. The annual samples include C corporations as well as pass through entities: S corporations, Regulated Investment Companies and Real Estate Investment Trusts. We exclude all pass through entities from our fi nal data set.
The second data source is the CORTAX data fi le. The CORTAX data fi le is an annual extract of certain data for fi rms included in the annual SOI corporate sample. The CORTAX data fi le contains all amendments and adjustments initiated by the taxpayer or IRS after the fi ling of the original tax return. For our purposes, CORTAX provides two valuable pieces of information. First, CORTAX reveals when a taxpayer applies for a carryback refund, the destination year to which the loss is applied to offset prior payments and the dollar amount of the refund. Second, CORTAX reveals whether or not a fi rm remains a viable business entity. If a fi rm does not fi le a tax return because it no longer exists in its previous form, COR-TAX will retain its employer identifi cation number for up to ten years, but all other fi elds will be blank. This convention allows us to use CORTAX to distinguish between fi rms that simply fall out of the annual SOI corporate sample for a given year from fi rms that no longer exist. 10 The latter case may arise due to mergers/acquisitions, deaths or conversion to S corporation status. If a fi rm no longer exists, then we assume that any pre-existing stock of loss carryforwards will never be used.
Methodology
For this analysis, we track how fi rms use NOLs over time beginning with losses generated in tax year 1993. We begin tracking 1993 NOLs because that year corresponds to the fi rst year that NOL stocks were reported on the corporate tax return. The NOL stock is equal to the amount of unused losses that fi rms carry forward into the tax year. If a fi rm reports a NOL stock carried into 1993, we require that the fi rm exhaust those NOLs prior to the utilization of any new NOLs generated in tax year 1993 or later. In this manner, we 9 A corporation can deduct capital losses only up to the amount of its capital gains. If the corporation cannot deduct the loss in the current tax year, it must carry the loss to other tax years and deduct it from any net capital gains that occur in those years. 10 Although very large fi rms are present in the SOI sample for all tax years, on occasion a large or mid-sized fi rm will miss one year due to a late-fi led return. We use data from CORTAX to plug necessary fi elds (e.g., taxable income) if there is a single miss year. This convention allows us to retain many fi rms that we would not otherwise be able to include. If a fi rm misses more than a single year, then we do not include them in our dataset.
stack pre-1993 NOLs first. If a firm claims a loss carryforward deduction from a pre-1993 loss, we cannot attribute that deduction to the specifi c loss year from which it originated. Rather, we simply attribute the deduction to pre-1993 losses.
Once a fi rm exhausts any pre-1993 NOL stock, we are able to track the utilization of any new NOLs. We manually compute the NOL stock brought forward each year by adding reported losses and deducting carryback refunds or carryforward deductions from the original NOL stock reported by the taxpayer.
11,12 For tax years ending prior to August 6, 1997, firms could carry back NOLs up to three tax years; otherwise fi rms may carry back two years. We use CORTAX data to attribute carryback refunds to the loss year from which they originated. The attribution of loss carryforwards to a specifi c loss year is more complicated. For that purpose, we vintage and track a fi rm's NOL inventory and attribute claimed loss carryforwards to the oldest NOLs carried in the inventory. This stacking order refl ects the fi rm's utilization pattern as NOLs will expire if unused. Net operating losses generated in tax years beginning before August 6, 1997 expire after 15 years. Net operating losses generated after that date expire after 20 years.
In certain instances, fi rms will claim a loss carryforward deduction that exceeds our computed NOL stock that is carried into the tax year. These unexplained loss carryforward deductions may arise due to unobserved adjustments made after the original tax return is fi led. For example, a taxpayer may fi le an amended return that increases the tax loss reported on their original return. Unexplained loss deductions may also occur if a fi rm acquires NOLs through a merger or acquisition. Although acquired NOLs are subject to significant restrictions, many firms are able to utilize them. In both cases, additional losses will appear in the fi rm's NOL inventory, but we will not know the tax year from which they originate. Our NOL vintaging methodology disregards those additional amounts; we only track and vintage reported losses or reported pre-existing stocks of losses. If these additional NOLs are eventually claimed as a loss carryforward deduction, we label those deductions "unexplained NOLDs" because it appears that the fi rm had insuffi cient stock to claim those deductions. We track unexplained NOLDs separately because (1) we cannot identify the loss year from which they originate, and (2) they may or may not arise from the reported tax losses that we attempt to track over time. We report "unexplained NOLDs" at the bottom of Table 2 .
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Dataset
Our fi nal dataset is comprised of two groups of firms. Our primary group 11 We note that two errors may result from this approach. First, a portion of the reported 1993 NOL stock may be restricted losses. Because we cannot distinguish these amounts from unrestricted NOLs, our methodology may understate the utilization of post-1993 losses since we assume the entire 1993 NOL stock is unrestricted. Second, it is possible that some portion of the 1993 NOL stock will expire unused. To the extent this occurs, we will again understate post-1993 loss utilization. Because any losses carried into 1993 expire after 15 years, it is likely that only a small portion of that NOL stock expired for fi rms included in our dataset. 12 Because 1993 is the initial reporting year for this fi eld (hence, some fi rms may have neglected to fi ll in amounts), we perform a check for reasonableness. We compare the NOL stock reported for 1993 to amounts reported for 1994 to ensure consistency. If the reported values are inconsistent, we rely on amounts reported for tax year 1994. For a relatively small group of fi rms, no NOL stock was reported for either year and the zero values appear implausible. We manually correct those amounts. 13 For a handful of large mergers/acquisitions, we make manual adjustments so that (1) the NOL stock of the acquired fi rm does not disappear (i.e., we add the stock to the successor fi rm), and (2) the NOL stock is properly vintaged in the inventory of the successor fi rm.
includes fi rms that are present in the SOI corporate sample for all years after they fi rst appear. This group includes fi rms that were present for all years 1993-2003 as well as fi rms that fi rst appear in the SOI corporate sample after 1993. New fi rms that we add over time tend to be smaller and less diversifi ed than their counterparts that are present for all tax years 1993-2003. If a fi rm fi rst appears after 2001, we do not include them. Hence, we require at least three consecutive years of tax data if a fi rm is included in our fi nal dataset.
The second group included in our dataset is fi rms that report tax data for at least three consecutive tax years, but subsequently cease to fi le a tax return under that employer identifi cation number. Using CORTAX data, we positively identify fi rms that no longer exist due to a merger/acquisition, death or conversion to S corporation status. If we cease to observe a fi rm due to death or conversion, then we assume that the fi rm's NOL stock will not be used. However, if a fi rm is acquired, then it is possible that the acquired NOL stock will be utilized in some fashion. Unfortunately, we cannot differentiate between these possible outcomes. For the purposes of this analysis, we assume that all preexisting NOL stock of acquisition/merger, death or conversion fi rms expires unused. We recognize that this assumption will understate loss utilization if acquired NOLs are, in fact, used. However, due to the restrictions placed on acquired NOLs, we believe that any understatement is likely small and is more than offset by our ability to make defi nitive statements regarding the large amount of NOLs that are never used due to deaths or the expirations that will eventually result due to the restrictions placed on acquired NOLs.
Finally, we note that our dataset includes both non-fi nancial and fi nancial entities. Due to their slightly different tax rules, prior loss studies excluded fi nancial entities (Altshuler and Auerbach, 1990; Auerbach and Poterba, 1986 ).
14 While their loss rules are somewhat different, we elect to include fi nancial entities because they now comprise a signifi cant portion of the corporate sector. For tax year 2003, the fi nal year of our dataset, fi nancial entities (defi ned as banks, credit intermediaries, broker-dealers and all insurers) reported nearly 40 percent of total Tax After Credits. Because fi nancial entities are generally more profi table than their non-fi nancial counterparts, they are able to utilize tax losses quickly. The exclusion of fi nancial entities would overstate the penalty imposed on the corporate sector from partial loss refundability.
CORPORATE POPULATION AND SAMPLE STATISTICS
To provide context for our dataset and results, we begin with selected tabulations for the C corporation population and corresponding fi gures for our dataset. Due to space constraints, we present data for every other tax year for tax years 1993-2003. We present both weighted and unweighted totals for NOLs and loss carryforward deductions. Weighted fi gures represent pro-rated amounts for all C corporations; unweighted amounts represent totals for sample fi rms only. We present unweighted totals to facilitate comparisons to our dataset. Our dataset captures approximately 90 percent of total unweighted NOLs and loss carryforwards. Because we are concerned with loss utilization rates, as opposed to dollar amounts, we do not pro-rate our dataset to the corporate universe. Table 1 presents data for the C corporation population and the dataset used for this analysis. As shown by Table 1 The NOL and loss carryforward deduction totals from Table 1 The bottom half of Table 1 presents corresponding fi gures for our dataset. The number of fi rms in our dataset increases over time since we capture new firms that appear in the SOI corporate sample.
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For tax year 1993, our dataset includes approximately 46,700 fi rms. The number of fi rms increases to 67,600 by 2001, then declines to 58,600 for 2003. The number of fi rms declines after 2001 because we do not pick up any "new" fi rms after that year, yet we allow deaths, mergers or S corporation conversions.
Despite the fact that we include new fi rms and fi rms that no longer exist, the average fi rm in our data set is less likely to report a tax loss compared to the average fi rm in the corporate universe. Loss fi rms comprise 30-40 percent of our dataset, versus 50 percent for the corporate universe. However, for fi rms that report a loss, our average loss is much larger, ranging from -$5 to -$14 million, versus -$0.1 to -$0.4 million for the corporate universe. Therefore, our dataset appears to underrepresent many small fi rms that report loss income. It is likely that those fi rms have lower loss utilization rates compared to fi rms included in our dataset. 51%  46%  37%  35%  34%  31%  26%  17%  28%  20%  12%  58%  39%  100%   31%  28%  36%  36%  36%  32%  26%  20%  11%  9%  3%  33%  29%  0%   18%  26%  27%  30%  30%  38%  48%  62%  61%  72%  86%  9%  33%  0% (1) Loss stock that is eliminated based on CORTAX data.
THE UTILIZATION OF NET OPERATING LOSSES
(2) NOL stock reported for tax year 1993. (3) NOL stock reported by fi rms that appear in SOI sample after tax year 1993.
(4) NOLDs attributable to acquired net operating losses, misreporting or post-fi ling adjustments not reported on original return. These NOLDs may or may not have arisen from losses we observe and capture in our tax loss column. Due to the uncertainty of origin, we do not include this amount in the tax loss column total.
cases, we cannot identify the loss year from which the deduction originates. We attribute reported tax losses to one of four categories for each tax year 1993-2003: (1) used as a net operating loss deduction, (2) used as a carryback refund (CB), (3) lost, and (4) remains to be used. We present both dollar amounts and shares for each category. As noted, we recognize that some portion of NOLs that we classify as "lost" may actually be utilized through mergers/acquisitions. Therefore, the percentage of NOLs we classify as "lost" is overstated, while the percentage of losses used as NOLDs will be understated.
For tax year 1993, fi rms had ten years to utilize the $71 billion in reported tax losses. During that ten-year window, approximately one-half of losses were used as a NOLD (38 percent) or carryback refund (13 percent). A little under one-third appear to be lost, while 18 percent remain to be used. As expected, we generally fi nd that as we reduce the number of years that fi rms have to use tax losses, each year a lower percentage are used or lost, while a higher percentage remain unused. A notable exception is tax years 2001-02 due to the uptick in carryback refunds. For those years, carryback refunds increased signifi cantly due to the Jobs Creation and Worker Welfare Act of 2002. The Jobs Creation Act included a temporary extension of the carryback window to fi ve years for NOLs generated in tax years ending in 2001 or 2002. It is likely that timing factors also contributed to this outcome. Many fi rms that reported signifi cant tax liability for tax years 1996-2000 also reported large tax losses for tax years 2001-02.
The bottom of Table 2 presents statistics for NOLDs where the loss origination year is unknown. For fi rms present in tax year 1993, $262 billion of NOL stock was brought into that tax year. Of that original stock, $151 billion (58 percent) was used as a NOLD, $87 billion (33 percent) was lost, and $25 billion (9 percent) remains to be used. These data suggest that pre-1993 losses have a higher utilization rate compared to losses generated in the earliest year of our dataset (1993) . One factor that may explain the difference in loss utilization rates may be the composition of fi rms that reported recent tax losses prior to 1993. Due to the 1990-91 recession, it is likely that a greater proportion of tax losses generated in those years were reported by fi rms that are typically profi table, compared to non-recession years. Presumably, those firms would utilize losses quickly. Hence, utilization rates for tax losses generated during recession years may be higher than rates for other stages of the economic cycle.
For new firms appearing after tax year 1993, $163 billion of NOL stock was brought into the fi rst year the fi rm appears in our dataset (1994 to 2001) . Of that original stock, $63 billion (39 percent) was used as a NOLD, $47 billion (29 percent) was lost and $53 billion (33 percent) remains to be used. Finally, for tax years 1993-2003, our dataset contains $73 billion of NOLDs that we cannot explain through reported losses or reported NOL stocks.
We note that the data from Table 2 show that large stocks of NOLs were generated in recent years and remain unused. Tax losses from those years are highly concentrated over a relatively small number of fi rms. These fi rms reside in industries that are cyclical, over-invested or characterized by high fi xed costs. Even if these industries return to profi tability, the concentration of NOLs suggests that utilization rates for tax losses generated in tax years 2000-2002 may be considerably lower than tax losses generated a decade earlier.
In Table 3 , we present additional detail on the time pattern of claimed NOLDs from Table 2 . As expected, the utilization of losses from a given tax year declines over time. The patterns from Table 3 suggest that utilization begins to decline within two or three years after the loss was 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Using tax return data for tax years 1993-2003, we fi nd that fi rms can incur signifi cant penalties from the US corporate loss regime due to the lag between the generation of a tax loss and its utilization. For tax year 2003, the latest year of our dataset, we observe fi rms that claim deductions from tax losses generated a decade earlier.
For other fi rms in our dataset, the entire value of the tax loss is eliminated due to the inability to use the loss as a carryforward deduction.
Although we examine overall loss utilization rates, we do not consider the implications of these findings for marginal tax rate differentials. As noted, loss carryforward firms may face higher or lower marginal tax rates on investment compared to taxable fi rms. Future work should examine how the time delay in loss utilization manifests itself in marginal tax rate discrepancies between industries and over time. Preliminary analysis of our dataset suggests that certain industries are penalized disproportionately by the partial loss refund regime. Moreover, the implicit penalty appears to increase over time.
